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Operation Mole Cricket 1. Wikipedia. Operation Mole Cricket 1. Watch online Code Name Abdul with subtitles 1280. Hebrew: . The operation was the first time in history that a Western- equipped air force successfully destroyed a Soviet- built surface- to- air missile (SAM) network.

Rising tensions between Israel and Syria over Lebanon escalated in the early 1. Syria deploying the SAM batteries in the Beqaa Valley. On June 6, 1. 98. Israel invaded Lebanon, and on the third day of the war, with clashes going on between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Syrian Army, Israel decided to launch the operation. The battle lasted about two hours, and involved innovative tactics and technology. By the end of the day, the IAF had destroyed seventeen of the nineteen SAM batteries deployed in the Beqaa Valley and shot down 9.

The battle led the United States to impose a ceasefire on Israel and Syria. Background. Syria deployed another 3. SAM batteries. In the first three days, the IAF lost 5. The SA- 6s, SA- 7s, and ZSU- 2.

Israel's prewar total of 1. A- 4 Skyhawks and 3.

F- 4 Phantoms. As a result, the IAF found it difficult to provide air support to the ground troops. When Egypt tried to push beyond the range of its SAM batteries on October 1. Ezer Weizman, a former IAF commander, said that . The Israelis had lost 1. The Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, then also Minister of Defense, announced that the IAF could destroy the SAM batteries in two hours. Ivry told the media that the IAF could do nothing of the kind. Syria responded by deploying its first SAM brigades to the Beqaa Valley.

The SAM batteries were not a direct strategic threat to Israel, and there were already several Syrian SAM batteries in east Lebanon, across the border. Begin faced a dilemma: on one hand, the new deployment damaged Israel's deterrence credibility and, on the other hand, a strike might lead to an unnecessary clash with Syria. Eventually, he decided on an attack, to be launched on April 3. Israel agreed to cancel the strike, and an American envoy, Philip Habib, was sent to the region as a mediator. He shuttled between Jerusalem and Damascus but failed to get the SAM batteries removed. The Syrian President, Hafez al- Assad, considered it a declaration of war, but believed that Syria was in no condition to fight it. On December 2. 0, the Cabinet of Israel convened for a weekly meeting, in which Defense Minister.

Ariel Sharon and the Chief of Staff (Ramatkal) Rafael Eitan presented the . Begin supported the plan, but other members of the Cabinet opposed and he decided to cancel it. At this point the name was changed to . The name was first revealed in 2. From this platform I call on President Assad to instruct the Syrian army not to harm Israeli soldiers and then nothing bad will happen to .

We desire no clashes with the Syrian army, if we reach the line 4. I am directing my words to the ears of the President of Syria. He knows how to keep an agreement.

Operation Mole Cricket 19; Part of the 1982 Lebanon War: Part of a Syrian SA-6 site built near the Beirut-Damascus highway, and overlooking the Beqaa Valley, in early. PVC-Boden jetzt im HORNBACH Onlineshop bestellen! Jetzt auch PVC Meterware bequem nach Hause schicken lassen. Große Auswahl und Dauertiefpreise bei HORNBACH. Join Gymbofriends to discuss kids clothing and all topics related to moms and make new amazing friends in our community.

He signed a cease- fire with us and kept it. He did not allow the terrorists to act. If he behaves in this manner now in Lebanon, no Syrian soldier will be harmed by our soldiers. Sharon used this as his principal argument for launching Mole Cricket 1. Nevertheless, Sharon gave North Command chief, Amir Drori, a go- ahead to drive on the Beqaa valley, and Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Levi flew to Ein Zahalta to tell the commander, Menachem Einan, that the IAF would attack the Syrian missiles that day. The IAF interpreted that move as a signal that Syria had no intention of becoming involved in a major war — otherwise the SAMs would have been positioned to defend the approach to Damascus.

The redeployment suggested to Ivry that they could strike the SAM sites without risking an all- out war with Syria. He said Syria had already begun moving its second armored division (the 3rd Armoured Division) south from Ein Zahalta. The political timetable dictated that waiting until Thursday would not leave enough time for a ground advance. Drori, who came with Sharon to the meeting, was against the attack, saying it was superfluous.

Eitan was ambivalent, preferring to limit the attack to a signal to the Syrians. The Communications Minister, Mordechai Tzipori, argued that Sharon's plan had exceeded the original forty- kilometer line. Sharon replied that the line had to be measured from Israel's northernmost point, Metula. He added that destroying the missile batteries in the Beqaa was necessary to save the force at Ein Zahalta. Sharon stressed the vulnerability of the soldiers in the field. Begin turned to Ivry's deputy, Amos Amir, and asked for his projection of the IAF's losses in such an attack. Begin supported the attack and eventually Burg was also convinced.

Sharon left the conference and issued an order for an air strike as well as a ground operation. Kfirs and Skyhawks were along the coastline from Sidon to the outskirts of Beirut, providing close air support for the ground troops and striking at Palestine Liberation Organization targets. At the second level, over 1. At the top level, Hawkeyes were stationed to ensure air control.

The first task force aircraft attacked the Syrian radar at the top of Jebel Baruk, which was commanding a large area. The second wave which attacked the SAM batteries at 3: 5.

PM was made up of 9. When the attack was launched, the Syrians ordered their combat air patrols to return to base and land.

The IAF command post in Tel Aviv provided Ivry a real- time command picture of the air battle through various data links. E- 2. Cs with airborne surveillance radar down- linked their pictures to the command post.

A squadron of Tadiran Mastiff and IAI Scout. Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) kept at least two vehicles in the air all the time, providing constant location of the SAM batteries. A two- way voice communications link between Ivry and his pilots was set up, allowing for real- time command. Syrian aircraft depended on ground- controlled interception (GCI) sites for command and control.

Once the Mastiffs were tracked by Syrian radar, the tracking signals were relayed to another Scout outside of the missiles' range. The Scout then relayed the signal to E2. C Hawkeye aircraft orbiting off the coast. The data gathered was analyzed by the E2. Cs and Boeing 7. 07 ECM aircraft.

We then used superior electronic devices which enabled us to . We rendered them ineffective to take reliable fixes on our aircraft aloft. But in advance of direct aerial attacks, we used long- range artillery. Selective airborne communications jamming disrupted the airwaves for the Mi.

G- 2. 1s and Mi. G- 2. AWACS- directed attacks from the Israeli F- 1. F- 1. 6s. The data was transmitted to the E- 2. Cs. The IAF took advantage of the fact that the Mi. Gs had only nose and tail alert radar systems and no side warnings or look- up and look- down systems, by jamming the GCI communications net. E- 2. Cs guided the Israeli aircraft into positions that enabled them to attack the Syrian aircraft from the side, where the latter would have no warning.

Because of the jamming, the Syrians GCI controllers could not direct their pilots toward the incoming Israeli aircraft. The imaginary line was actually the range of the missile batteries in Syria proper. The basic tactic of the Syrian air force is to take to the air and to cross this imaginary line, which brings them outside the protective range of their home- based missiles.

They do what they can, then run back for cover. The IAF suffered no losses.

The operation was stopped shortly after 4: 0. PM. Colonel Aviem Sella, a member of the operation staff, later said that Sharon severely criticized that decision. Their missile batteries fired at our planes. We had no choice other than to approve a military operation to destroy the missile buildup. He called the operation . Sharon maintained that on June 6 he had ordered the IDF not to cross the Awali River and to avoid a confrontation with the Syrians.

Sharon said he did order the army to prepare for a contingency plan, however, to drive on the Beirut- Damascus highway in case the Syrians attacked first. The Soviets refused but prepared large amounts of military equipment at airfields for dispatch to Syria and sent Marshall Pavel Stepanovich Kutakhov to Syria to find out what happened to the Syrian SAMs, fearing that NATO might do the same in Eastern Europe. On June 9, Assad met with American envoy Habib in Damascus and rejected his terms, demanding that Israel withdraw its forces from Lebanon as a condition for a ceasefire. US President. Ronald Reagan called on Begin and Assad to accept a ceasefire effective at 6: 0.

AM, on June 1. 0. The newspaper also reported a meeting with a Syrian airman who recounted an engagement in which he shot down an Israeli F- 1. Even within Soviet ranks, these claims met with great skepticism. He told Ivry that the operation made the Soviets understand that Western technology was superior to theirs, and that in his view, the blow to the Beqaa Valley SAMs was an impetus to Glasnost and the Soviet Union's collapse. Air Force Magazine Online. Israeli F- 1. 5 Eagle Units in Combat, 2.

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